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Abstract: For almost 25 years, UK corporate governance has been guided by an evolving 
code of practice. This paper examines the processes and debate during codification, starting 
with Cadbury in 1992, and then subsequent versions written in response to crises. Focusing 
on one contested issue, board design, and through a close reading of contributions to the 
consultations, the analysis shows the process had three outcomes: embedding power with 
central actors and creating a community of governance that legitimated disparate actors. 
However, it failed to engage emerging voices in a rapidly changing market context, raising 
questions over its likelihood to retain legitimacy. 
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Introduction 
A quarter of a century ago, the reforms entailed in the Cadbury Code set much of the 
world on a course towards a new type of corporate governance, shaking up and codifying the 
structures of corporate boards. It and the subsequent iterations of what is now called the UK 
Corporate Governance Code are widely regarded as hallmark achievements in institutional 
development, incorporating guidelines tight enough to allow those sitting outside to track 
performance, with the flexibility to allow those inside to bend those structures to withstand a 
storm. The code has been seen as a tremendous success, if success is assessed by the degree 
of compliance and what Forbes and Milliken1 call the effort norms of boards.  
In view of the financial crisis of 2007-09 and the long economic malaise that followed, 
the code might also be considered an abject failure. It was born in an emergency, to prevent 
future major corporate failures like the near-simultaneous collapses of Polly Peck, BCCI and 
the two listed companies run by Robert Maxwell, which had precipitated creation of the 
Cadbury Committee and then informed its work.2 But the failures of Northern Rock in 2007 
and the next year of HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)3 were more severe in their 
consequences, for those firms, for the economic and financial system in which they operated, 
and for society at large than anything the Cadbury Committee had to contemplate. Moreover, 
all three firms had followed the recommendations of the code, and where they did not 
comply, they provided an explanation.  
What went wrong? That question involves multiple dimensions, ranging from 
developments in global capital markets to the institutions of banking regulation. Yet we can 
also ask in what ways the code itself and the processes of its development had contributed to 
the shortcomings so obviously manifest in the near-meltdown of the banking system.  
This paper considers the latter question through a lens of how institutional change affects 
and then embeds power. The decision to codify corporate governance presented an 
opportunity to reconfigure power over corporations and the people who lead them. The code 
structured the previously unstructured work of boards, establishing paths of accountability in 
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a complex system of parties with interests in the corporation and its products, processes and 
performance.  
Institutionalising certain solutions tends to favour one set of configurations over others, 
precluding attention to others.4 In so doing, it establishes power relationships, embedding 
them, and thus introducing at least potential rigidity. In dealing with the complexity in 
corporate governance, the UK code has embedded the practice of regular revision, re-opening 
the debate and letting old, rejected recipes to get another hearing and a chance of emerging. 
In effect, it has institutionalised the opportunity for de-institutionalisation.  
This makes the failure of the code all the more puzzling. How did the code, through 
repeated consultations, drafting and reformulations, fail to seek out other, more radical 
solutions, even as experiments, to address the risks and opportunities in the changing market 
and institutional contexts? To examine this question, this paper examines in detail a debate 
that rages during formulation of the Cadbury Code,5 and afterwards, over one particularly 
contentious issue throughout the history of corporate governance: the design of the board of 
directors.  
Specifically, the contestation concerned, and concerns, the choice between the unitary 
board favoured in UK and US practice and the two-tier board common in continental Europe. 
As we will see, a close reading of the contributions of interested parties to the consultations 
undertaken by the late Sir Adrian Cadbury in 1991 and 1992 shows that the issue was hotly 
debated, and that Cadbury himself was open to alternatives. While victory on the large issue 
then went to the incumbents, peripheral actors won many concessions towards a two-tier 
board via the back door, and the issue never goes to rest. As the next great crisis in corporate 
governance in the early 2000s, it arose again, only to get pushed back with more adaptatios. 
And again, in the wake of the financial crisis later in that decade, a protracted, three-stage 
consultation focused on it again, with the same outcome, yet still without a move towards the 
sort of experimentation that Cadbury had contemplated.  
In their analysis of how the language of the code has developed over time, Nordberg and 
McNulty6 demonstrate how Cadbury’s initial emphasis on structures became layered with 
stronger emphasis on board independence and the role of non-executive directors following 
the crisis in the early 2000s, and then with the importance of relationships once the financial 
crisis of 2007-09 highlighted the shortcomings of both structure and independence. These 
changes of focus suggest, in effect, sedimentation of institutional logics7 as the code evolved 
over time, with older logics still present throughout. Their article, however, considers only 
the code’s language, not other voices, and how it reflects the market and institutional contexts 
of the three time periods. It describes but does not analyse the processes used.  
Spira and Slinn8 delve into the question of processes in the drafting of the Cadbury Code, 
drawing upon the Cadbury Archive of committee notes and contributions from the 
consultations Cadbury conducted. They show a jostling among the various actors from the 
fields of corporations, investors, accountants, advisers, pressure groups and politicians. A rich 
and flavourful account full of personalities and anecdotes, their book stops short of theorising 
processes or drawing many implications for the practice of corporate governance, regulation 
or institution-building.  
This paper employs techniques from both those studies to look behind the scenes at how 
the code developed over time, drawing on the language-in-use by a variety of actors in the 
centre and on the periphery of the debate, and those in between. Specifically, it considers the 
issue of board design and shows how actors near the centre controlled the debate through 
assertions of power more than argument. As well as showing the richness of the debate, it 
also demonstrates how central actors drown out disparate voices, and how the processes of 
consultation and the opportunities for revision win broad acceptance among the affected 
social actors. But set against a radically changing market and institutional context, this 
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analysis also suggests that continuity in that code and the actors engaged in drafting may 
serve to undermine the legitimacy of the institution the code has created.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section sets out the rationale for 
the study by sketching the development of the code and its impact in the UK and abroad. 
Then we explore the market and institutional contexts to appreciate their shape at the time of 
the initial codification and how they have changes in subsequent years. After a discussion of 
methods, we then look in details at the debate over board design, in 1991-92, 2003, and then 
in the drafting of the 2010 UK Corporate Governance Code. This leads to a discussion of the 
code, consultation processes and the changing context to highlight how the code’s evolving 
logic of corporate governance both informed practice and institutionalised. It also leads to 
questions about how well or poorly the process sits with the new context.  
Development and impact of the UK code 
The UK Corporate Governance Code is an evolving institution that has changed the 
conduct of boards of directors and institutional investors in many ways. It has also influenced 
thinking in many countries,9 in Europe and further afield, not only in Commonwealth 
countries with institutional similarities to the UK, but also in civil law jurisdictions10 and in 
the self-regulatory codes of the US stock exchanges.11 The code through its various revisions 
has prescribed various mechanisms to foster good governance, including the separation of the 
role of CEO and chairman; the use of independent, non-executives directors; and creation of 
committees to consider remuneration, audit and nominations. The code valorises the unitary 
board of UK practice with its combination of executive and non-executive directors, while 
shifting the balance between them over time, with non-executives gaining a steadily more 
important role. In so doing it lays aside the idea of a continental European-style, two-tier 
board, though as we will see only after a fight.  
A shifting market and institutional context 
The UK has traditionally had an open, internationally minded capital market, yet it was 
for many centuries also a market of close personal relationships. Even in the 21st Century, 
newspapers write about ‘City grandees’ serving as company chairmen or heads of 
government enquiries into various economic and social problems.12 Sir Adrian Cadbury, 
scion of the Cadbury family who created and many years led the chocolate maker of that 
name, was among them.  
The Cadbury Committee came into existence to examine what went wrong in what 
seemed at the time a stunning set of seemingly unrelated corporate failures, specifically with 
a mandate to restore the credibility of corporations and the ‘financial aspects of corporate 
governance’.13 Was there something wrong, systemically, with the corporation, with 
accounting and audit, or with the relationship between companies and investors? If so, then 
changes in company law, in accountancy principles or audit rules, or in the property rights of 
shareholders might forestall future such cases. That is, changes in institutional arrangements, 
in particular the formal institutions of law and regulation, might be needed. But the 
committee was a creature of markets, in particular of the London Stock Exchange and the 
accountancy professional bodies, not government,14 suggesting a desire to find a non- or less-
institutionalised alternative, one in which a new logic might inform a way of thinking that 
could become widely accepted and eventually taken-for-granted.15  
In the quarter of a century since then, much has changed. At the time of Cadbury, UK-
based pension funds, insurance companies and collective investment vehicles held the 
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majority of shares listed on the London exchange. By 2012, foreign investors would 
dominate ownership of UK-listed companies, including sovereign wealth funds16 as well as 
conventional investors from abroad.17 Both domestic and foreign investors now also include 
hedge funds and other alternative investment vehicles, with different ambitions, clients, time 
horizons and methods of interacting with corporations.18  
Law and regulation have changed as well. London, once famous for its reliance on a 
system of professional self-regulation moderated by the ‘raised eyebrow’ of the governor of 
the Bank of England, saw gradual, then transformational change as the ‘Big Bang’ market 
reforms of the late 1980s undermined cosy relationships in the ‘City’, as the financial district 
is known. With a change in government in 1997 came a wholesale change in the regulatory 
environment. At the retail end of the market, lawyers and accountants lost their authority to 
manage investments of wealthy clients unless they earned separate qualifications from the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). The London Stock Exchange, a mutual organisation 
owned by market actors in 1992, became a public company listed on its own exchange. It was 
forced to shed its regulatory arm, the UK Listing Authority, which became part of the new 
FSA, which also subsumed a raft of self-regulatory regimes for pensions, investment, 
lending. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC), once a creature of the accountancy 
profession, became a governmental agency.  
The so-called ‘New Labour’ government of Tony Blair embarked on a reform of 
Company Law in 1998, shortly after coming to power. It was a task it did not complete until 
2005, owing to resistance from the City and corporations to its plan to define director duties 
for the first time in statute and disagreements within the party. Opening the door of law 
reform gave an opportunity to reconsider the question of unitary and two-tier boards. In the 
end that door never opened very widely, however. Director duties, when eventually codified, 
required boards to give ‘due regard’ to employees, suppliers and customers. But its 
embodiment of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ it endorsed shareholder primacy,19 rather than 
the more radical changes many ‘Old Labour’ activists advocated. 
Further changes would come following the election of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government in 2010, breaking the FSA in two and putting both wings under the 
Bank of England. But the die remained cast: Regulation was a formal institution of the state; 
markets were global and increasingly unattached from the UK, except for the not-so-small 
matter of residual risk in cases of catastrophic failure, as taxpayer-funded rescues in the 
banking sector demonstrated.  
UK law and regulation both depend upon and inform what emanates from the European 
Union, where this period saw substantial change. Among the measures adopted were a string 
of reforms to voting rights for shareholders, including an easing of constraints on cross-
border voting and the power of shareholders to reject remuneration policies. These changes 
transferred power from corporations to investors, legitimating the logic of shareholder 
primacy at the expense of non-investor constituencies as well as corporate boards. 
Within changing market and institutional contexts, the process of codification of 
corporate governance means that what discretion remains over the control of corporate 
resources is a contest between other actors, and notably those in the centre of the field, 
corporate boards and institutional investors. After a discussion of methods, we consider what 
took place as the UK code took shape over the issue of board design.  
Methods 
Following the approach of Nordberg and McNulty,20 this study focuses on three versions 
of the UK code, the Cadbury Code,21 the post-Enron Combined Code of 2003,22 and the 
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renamed UK Corporate Governance Code.23 The code has changed on several other 
occasions, but this selection is justified because it considers the three times the consultations 
took place in a time of a perceived crisis in corporate governance, when willingness to 
entertain substantial change was strong.  
The Cadbury Committee convened following several failures of prominent UK 
enterprises. The 2003 code and the Higgs Review that inspired it followed corporate 
governance failures in the US (Enron, WorldCom and many others), the Netherlands (Royal 
Ahold), Italy (Parmalat) and Australia (HIH), as well as all many dot-com technology 
flotations around the world in the late 1990s. Then, after the near collapse of the global 
banking system and the home-grown problems at Northern Rock, RBS and HBOS, the UK 
government commissioned the 2009 Walker Review24 of governance of financial institutions. 
The Financial Reporting Council, which regulates accountancy and audit, pulled forward a 
planned review of the corporate governance, completing an 18-month and three-phase 
consultation in 2010. 
Specifically, the consultations analysed for this study were 1) the formal submissions 
following the Cadbury draft in May 1992, as well as related material from before the draft; 2) 
the brief, ‘fatal flaws only’ consultation after the Higgs Review in 2003; and 3) all three 
phases of the 2009-10 consultation. Some of the Cadbury documents were examined online; 
those not digitised were viewed at the Cadbury archive at the University of Cambridge 
(referenced below with numbers beginning with CAD).  Some of the contributions in 2003 
were provided for this study by the Financial Reporting Council, others were discovered 
through web searches in an inactive but still public directory on the FRC website. Those for 
the three 2009-10 consultations were harvested from the FRC website after the consultation 
periods ended.  
The consultations all involved more than just formal submissions. Interviews, informal 
gatherings and public meetings of interested parties took place (for a summary of the 
consultation process, see Appendix 1). While no systematic record of these exists, it seems 
reasonable to assume that those involved in drafting the code itself would have paid close 
attention to written evidence. In the case of Cadbury Report, the archive gives evidence of 
that, as the discussion below describes. However, notes by Sir Adrian Cadbury indicate that 
one non-submission is of particular interest, and it has been included for this study: An 
opinion column in the Financial Times by Sir Owen Green25 clearly affected the committee’s 
thinking; it was noted in internal papers of the Cadbury committee and cited with approval by 
several important external contributors.  
Each instance this paper examines involved more than 100 submissions. Analysis 
involved an initial reading of the all available texts, which ranged from one to 35 pages, 
followed by iterative reading of a sample selected on two theoretical grounds. First, the study 
applied a criterion of salience. Assuming that all respondent voices were legitimate, the 
analysis took the centrality of actors in the field as an indicator of power and the force of the 
language to indicate urgency.26 This led to identification of texts using stronger rhetoric, the 
ones more likely, that is, to impress the codes’ authors. Second, texts were selected from 
actors in different parts of the investment supply chain. It also examined contributions from 
peripheral actors, who might offer different or dissonant voices, following the views of 
Greenwood and Suddaby27 that powerful, central actors were likely agents of institutional 
change, but also of Rao and Giorgi28 that peripheral players might effect change through 
importing ideas from adjacent fields. This detailed scrutiny involved 13 submissions in 1992, 
12 in 2003 and 18 documents from six organisations that responded in all three phases of the 
2009-10 consultation, leading to iterative reading of other texts. 
Initial, theory-led coding led to categorisation according to assumptions from 
perspectives including agency, stewardship and resource dependency, and by practice-led 
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terms, including boards, directors, investors, advisers, etc. This close reading of the texts led 
to a second, data-led thematic categorisation, from which the topic of board design emerged 
as a candidate for closer examination. That issue concerned a structure deeply embedded in 
practice that seemed to stand little chance of being changed. But because of its political 
significance it did surface – and resurfaced – seeming to encapsulate the heart of the 
argument about corporate governance and the role of boards.  
Shape of the board 
The unitary board has long been a feature of British corporate governance. Nonetheless, a 
debate emerged in all three periods: Should the UK retain its unitary boards or move towards 
a two-tier board favoured by the European Commission and arising in a particular form in 
Germany? That country’s superior economic performance lent cognitive legitimacy29 to the 
logic that two-tier boards are a ‘better’ instrument of corporate governance. The argument for 
a two-tier approach was that supervisory boards increase independence; the resulting 
challenge to the power of the executives might prevent the next shock.30   
The argument against, often subtextual in this debate, concerns Germany’s use of 
Mitbestimmung, or co-determination, a legal mechanism to involve labour unions in 
determining corporate policy.31 The German system is often viewed as the principal contrast 
to Anglo-American practice.32 Unitary boards unite one set of individuals in both the 
boundary-spanning ‘service’ activities, facilitating access to scarce external resources as 
emphasised in stewardship theory, and the performance-monitoring ‘control’ activities in 
agency theory; dual board systems tend to emphasise the ‘control’ aspects of the upper or 
supervisory board.  
 Board design in the 1992 Cadbury debate 
One reason for the sensitivity on this issue was a longstanding dispute over the European 
Commission’s campaign for a Fifth Company Law Directive. The fight lasted for nearly two 
decades and was resolved only by a decision not to decide.33 The third attempt to pass it, 
starting in 1988, was opposed strongly by UK business people and the Conservative Party 
government of Margaret Thatcher.34 The Directive sought two politically charged measures: 
a) the use of two-tier corporate boards, and b) some degree of worker co-determination.  
A general election was due by the spring of 1992, however, and the opposition Labour 
party might well have taken a different stance. In a meeting with Sir Adrian Cadbury in 
September 1991, Marjorie Mowlam, the opposition Labour Party’s spokesman on ‘City’ 
affairs, made clear her party’s intention to legislate unless the Cadbury Committee made 
substantive changes, though Sir Adrian’s notes of the meeting did not mention directly the 
issue of board design (CAD-01239). Other Labour party members, however, saw value in 
two-tier boards in submissions to the committee’s early deliberations (CAD-01145, CAD-
01148) and reflected in related articles in academic journals.35  
Even after the election in April 1992 had unexpectedly given the Conservatives another 
term in power, the Liberal Democrats’ response to the draft code (CAD-02443) urged two-
tier boards with employee representation on the lower tier, management board. It also 
suggested that worker votes be counted alongside shareholder votes at the annual meeting.  
That was an extreme position from a peripheral voice, a party with little realistic chance 
of coming to power soon. But the papers in the Cadbury archive suggest there was some 
sympathy for the topic within the committee. Jonathan Charkham, the Bank of England 
adviser attached to the committee, wrote to Cadbury during comment period on the draft 
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assessing a proposal from two contributors to the consultation36 to give specific powers to 
non-executives as ‘three-quarters of the way to a two-tier board’. He continued: 
  
There is much logic in what they propose but I have no doubt that it would 
arouse the fiercest wrath among our critics who can see only too clearly this 
kind of development coming and are thoroughly scared of real 
accountability (CAD-01073).  
This note shows an important voice arguing that radical change of some sort was needed. 
Indeed, two years after the code was published, when the committee was conducting its first 
planned review, Sir Adrian sought legal clarification from the Department of Trade and 
Industry, an indication he considered the issue important. Nigel Peace, the DTI official who 
had been secretary to the Cadbury Committee, responded that company law did not prohibit 
two-tier boards (CAD-01363). 
The Cadbury Committee and Sir Adrian personally conducted a wide-ranging series of 
interviews and received written suggestions from even more people in what was by current 
practice a rather informal consultation. After publishing a draft code in May 1992, the 
committee undertook a more formal consultation to guide the final language, published in 
December. Because the draft elicited responses from a wide spectrum of people and 
organisations affected, the rest of this discussion will concentrate on the more formal, second 
phase.  
In its review of those responses, the Cadbury Committee took special note of three 
categories of respondents from companies, investors and the accountancy profession, an 
analytic device followed here. They were summarised for committee members in CAD-
02255, CAC-02257, CAD-02259, respectively.  
Investor reactions: Fund management organisations wrote mainly dispassionately but expressed concern over 
steps that might split corporate boards into opposing camps of executives and non-executives. One contributor sees 
something ‘dangerous’ in the draft, but ‘in one or two places’; another says draft makes ‘too great a distinction’ but 
adds director interests are only ‘somehow opposed’; a comment on the ‘different roles but equal responsibilities’ 
accepts division even as it affirms unity; changes ‘may bring a distinction’ between classes of directors; the report 
‘undermines’ the concept of the unitary board, but only ‘to some extent’. (For the fuller context of these remarks, see  
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Table 1.) 
------------------------------- 
Place   
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Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
An important voice was that of the Association of British Insurers, whose membership 
invested in assets amounting to about 25 per cent of the value of the stock market at the time. 
Many were themselves listed companies, and so had interests straddling the 
investor/corporation divide. The ABI eschewed emotive language on this issue, with the 
exception of the ambiguously placed word ‘disappointing’ in the following passage: 
 
It is perhaps disappointing that there are some who clearly feel that the 
recommendations undermine the concept of the unitary board, and it might 
be helpful if the final report emphasised rather more forcefully the support 
for the unitary board (ABI, CAD-02467). 
At first its disappointment seems to be with the ‘some’ who criticise the draft report, 
suggested by the proximity of the two words. But the ABI is not in substance disappointed 
with those who defend the unitary boards. It is disappointed, rather, with the Cadbury 
Committee for not being more firmly in favour of them, though that point comes clear only 
after the friendly offer of something ‘helpful’. The word order and diction thus seek to 
accommodate sensitivities to criticism on this point. That this voice needed to be 
accommodated becomes clear from the committee’s own minutes (e.g. CAD-01303).  
The Pensions Investment Research Consultants, a proxy voting advisory firm 
representing mainly local authority pension plans, took a stronger line than mainstream fund 
managers in favour of unitary boards, but with a different aim: 
 
At present many companies insulate some or all of the executive directors 
from the need to retire and seek election by shareholders. We think this is a 
serious infringement of shareholder rights and reduces directors’ 
accountability. It also strikes at the heart of the unitary board in which all 
directors are equally accountable under law (PIRC37).  
As these sentences make clear, PIRC is concerned about increasing accountability 
through elections. It wants to ensure that executive directors face re-election to the board just 
as often as non-executives. This seeks a different type of board unity than other respondents 
had in mind, one seeking stronger control over executives, not greater cooperation in the 
boardroom.  
Accountancy reactions: Generally though not entirely, the accountants’ contributions on 
board design objected to the draft and defended the corporate status quo. The first two of the 
responses in Table 2 ameliorate the critique with phrases like ‘tends to imply’ and 
‘understand and accept’. But the more forceful language of the third quote (‘unrealistic’, 
‘inimical’) suggests that feelings were strong. In a handwritten note (CAD-02475), Sir Adrian 
commented that he was ‘a bit shaken by the Ernst & Young demolition job’.38  
------------------------------- 
Place Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, an important professional 
association whose members included many company chairmen and finance directors, 
responded to the draft more gently than the accountancy firms themselves:  
 
Many have commented, too, that the report appears to recommend 
structures and systems which bring about the existence of something close 
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to a two-tier board, in everything but name. The recommendation in favour 
of a leader for the independent element on the board, where the chairman 
and chief executive role is combined, and for the use of outside advisers by 
non-executives are examples in support of this perception. We believe that 
the truth or otherwise of this assessment should be more fully addressed in 
the final report and that it would be valuable if a discussion of the 
comparative merits of unitary and two-tier boards in the UK environment 
could be included, additionally. We do not, incidentally, favour the 
appointment of a leader for the non-executive directors (ICAEW, CAD-
02181).  
The mild phrasing of ‘it would be valuable’ can be read as a quiet taunt to the Cadbury 
Committee to justify its position; the word ‘incidentally’ undermines with irony the neutral 
reference earlier in the passage to the idea of a leader of the non-executives.39 
Corporate reactions: Corporate critiques were unequivocal in advocating a unitary 
board and opposing European approaches, including two highlighted in the summary 
document circulated to the full committee (CAD-02255):  
 
This risks appearing to encourage a two tier board system, and detracts 
from the fundamental concept of collective board responsibility. Any 
change in this approach should be statutory. Assuming the Committee 
supports the UK’s unitary system, it should explicitly state this, and the 
reasons why it prefers this system (Sir Patrick Sheehy, chairman of BAT40). 
The whole thrust of the report is to retain the unitary board but to attempt to 
engraft a two-tier structure on to it. This is not a workable arrangement 
(The General Electric Co. plc; also in CAD-02115).  
That summary did not, however, record some of the stronger sentiments received from 
the corporate side, excluding ones using the emotive words ‘danger’, ‘resist’, ‘erode’, 
‘poachers’ and ‘sham’, nor an appeal to more rationalist considerations (from Sir Adrian’s 
former family chocolate company) concerning possible loss of ‘commercial advantage’. 
These remarks are summarised in Table 3: 
------------------------------- 
Place Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
Perhaps the most forceful statement came not from a submission to the committee, but 
instead an opinion column published in the Financial Times newspaper, written by Sir Owen 
Green, chairman of BTR and an emblematic executive of the era.41 The article was 
provocatively titled ‘Why Cadbury leaves a bitter taste’. He criticised many aspects of the 
draft report, including the idea of a ‘leader’ of the non-executives, and asserted that  
 
A more divisive aspect … is the way it strikes at the heart of the unitary 
board. It begins by restating the legal position that all directors are equally 
responsible for the board’s decisions. But the committee immediately 
reveals its view of the real purpose of non-executive directors. They are 
there to monitor the performance of the board (including themselves?) and 
that of the chief executive.42 
The phrase ‘reveals its real purpose’ signals a conspiracy exposed, while ‘divisive’ warns 
of adverse consequences and ‘strikes at the heart’ points metaphorically at murderous intent 
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towards the British way of organising boards. The forcefulness of its sentiment and the 
impact of its argument is indicated by how Green’s column was quoted in the committee’s 
summary of contributions, in notes between committee staff, and by various letters that 
favourably cited Green’s remarks.  
Support for two-tier boards: Only a few voices supported the idea of two-tier boards, 
none with the fervour of the Liberal Democrats. The accountancy firm Arthur Andersen, in a 
detailed and closely argued analysis, said the committee had paid insufficient attention to 
what it termed the three roles of boards: supervision, control and management:  
 
We believe the Report should be more forthright with respect to the 
supervisory function of the board. It should clarify the objectives and 
procedures that fall within the supervisory function and recommend that in 
all circumstances, the supervisory role should be led by a specific non-
executive director. 
The Report is predicated on the view that the unitary system is appropriate 
and the unitary board is itself capable of fulfilling the supervisory function. 
While we accept that the recommendations in the Report will facilitate 
supervision, it is disappointing that the Report does not discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of alternative forms of governance and 
encourage experimentation (Arthur Andersen, CAD-02361). 
While emphasising ‘supervision’, the term used for the upper board in a two-tier system, 
this language falls short of advocacy of European-style boards. The phrase ‘predicated on the 
view’ embeds less critique than other expressions of similar content might. But scepticism 
echoes in the use of ‘itself’, an otherwise redundant reflexive, as well as in the 
‘disappointing’ choice not to ‘encourage experimentation’. That Arthur Andersen would 
encourage such experiments suggests a position more nearly aligned with concerns of 
peripheral players about the need for radical change in board design than with actors at the 
core of the debate or some other intermediaries.43 The committee’s summary (CAD-02259) 
quoted the Arthur Andersen view at far greater length than those from other accountancy 
firms. Sir Adrian made the notation ‘experimentation’ alongside ‘unitary board’ in his 
handwritten aide memoire concerning possible revisions to the draft (CAD-01267), 
suggesting he took these comments seriously. 
Most of these texts involve assertions of unspecified virtues of unitary boards and 
warnings of unspecified dangers in two-tier boards. A subtext came to the surface, however, 
in several contributions. Richard Lloyd, chairman of Vickers, argued that UK board practice 
was ‘more genuinely unitary in its nature’ than what happened in the United States or Canada 
(CAD-01357). J.B.H. Jackson, a self-described ‘professional chairman’, also worried about 
importing US practice. Sir Owen Green44 was more scathing, attacking the idea of an audit 
committee entirely composed of non-executives as the ‘least meritorious’ in the draft, 
‘notwithstanding the practice in the US’. He then added venom: ‘The arrogance of this 
imported proposal is communicated through the committee’s own words’ as the draft 
proposes limits to auditors’ responsibility while it ‘blandly describes the unlimited liability of 
the board’.  
The foreignness of this element of board design perceived in the Cadbury draft came in 
complaints from several others about ‘continental’ or ‘German’ practices, as well as some 
oblique and occasionally direct references to European legislation (e.g. CBI, CAD-02349). 
Ernst & Young linked the two themes in warning that the ‘failure to implement a more 
effective regulatory regime in the UK now may well deprive the UK of the ability to 
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influence future proposals which, we believe, will emerge from the European Commission 
for a European Securities and Exchange Commission’ (CAD-02447), a contribution noted in 
the committee summary as well (CAD-02259). 
The ‘precipitating jolt’45 the UK system had received from the failures of Polly Peck, 
Colorall and especially the Maxwell companies46 forced a debate over the appropriateness of 
an aspect of corporate governance that industry had long defended. Opposition was based on 
economic and political considerations but in particularly on the social aspects of board 
dynamics. The voices from the twin centres of the debate – corporations and investors – as 
well as much of the intermediaries argued with varying degrees of force against foreign 
encroachment in the issue of board design, even though the Cadbury draft report did not 
explicitly advocate either a German-style supervisory board or an American-style board 
overwhelmingly populated with outside directors. The strength of opposition is evident in the 
language of these contributions. Several complained that the changes the draft report sought 
would demand much effort from companies already well governed, and fail to address the 
rogues. Green’s column in the FT put it this way:  
 
The report’s subliminal message is of the need for total integrity and a 
healthy objectivity in company affairs. This is strongly to be supported. But 
the need for a code in addition to existing rules and regulations is doubtful – 
as is its likely effectiveness in reducing the relatively few instances of 
misbehaviour.47 
His use of ‘subliminal message’ evokes symbolically the spectre of manipulative 
advertising techniques, which had entered public and academic discourse over in previous 
decades through critiques of technologies to project images interstitially in television 
signals.48 Although Green endorses the message, he opposes the medium of its delivery. 
In his briefing to the committee about feedback on the draft, Sir Adrian worried about the 
tone: ‘We are said to be ‘long on accountability and short on drive and efficiency’ and to take 
a negative view of governance’; the code risked ‘dividing the board’. The first part of these 
comments highlights the draft’s emphasis on control, rather than service, as the function of 
corporate governance; dividing the board would divide those functions. He then added 
remarks that imply the code could damage the unity of a board with a weak chairman: 
 
Do we stay with these? Minor changes … are no problem. I accept that 
there is a fundamental issue here and that there could come a point when 
logic would point to a two-tier board. I do not believe we are at that point 
yet, (although those who advocate distinct legal duties for ned’s49 would 
pass it), and that the unity of boards need not be undermined by our 
proposals, given a competent chairman (Sir Adrian Cadbury, CAD-01265). 
The tone of the code changed as a result of the comments and criticism, but these notes 
from the Cadbury archive suggest the issue was still alive under the surface, even after the 
final version’s support for the unitary board. That Sir Adrian thought ‘there could come a 
point when logic would point to a two-tier board’ suggests that the issue was still open, even 
though hostility had closed it, for now. 
Board design in the 2003, post-Higgs debate 
In the covering letter to his report, Derek Higgs50 wrote: ‘The brittleness and rigidity of 
legislation cannot dictate the behaviour, or foster the trust, I believe is fundamental to the 
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effective unitary board and to superior corporate performance’.51 Moreover, he expressed the 
view that the ‘architecture’ of corporate governance, defined as structure and processes inside 
companies, ‘in itself does not deliver good outcomes’.52 Yet his 53 recommendations, 
summarised at the beginning of the document, dealt overwhelmingly with ‘architecture’, that 
is, externally verifiable procedures and structures. These proposals revived concerns about 
two-tier boards and dominated the consultation the Financial Reporting Council held to 
translate those recommendations into the text of a new Combined Code. 
The passage from Higgs quoted above considers a unitary board to be an implicit good, 
and in one of the introductory paragraphs he elaborates that view:  
 
Some have argued that the increasing complexity of business life – whether 
globalisation or fast changing product and capital markets – is such that the 
whole structure of the board needs to be re-considered. But the majority 
view, which I share, sees considerable benefits continuing to flow from the 
unitary approach.53 
As if to emphasise that point, he later adds: 
 
Increasing the effectiveness of non-executive directors, while preserving the 
benefits of the unitary board, is a principal objective of the Review…. In 
contrast, the European system of corporate governance typically separates 
legal responsibility for running the company between a management and a 
supervisory board. In the US, the board is composed largely of non-
executive (‘outside’) directors with only a few executives. Evidence 
collected during the Review has not convinced me of the merits of moving 
away from the unitary board structure in the UK.54 
This language shows, however, that the debate over board design was not over. The uses 
of ‘unitary’ here are defensive: the ‘whole structure’ needs to be reviewed; that he is ‘not 
convinced’ about two-tier boards leaves this issue open in general, just closed for the 
moment. That he shares the ‘majority’ view acknowledges the legitimacy of the minority. He 
has considered other systems (‘European’ and US) but concludes that the evidence in their 
favour is not convincing, but its subtext further legitimates those views. Evidence in favour of 
the UK system is not mentioned, an indication that he and the respondents to his consultation 
and research study took those advantages as understood, but the word ‘unitary’ does not 
appear in Higgs’s proposed text of a revised Combined Code. Whether intended or not, taken 
together these uses and omissions seemed to give respondents reasons to think Higgs had 
taken a position somewhat short of a ringing endorsement of the unitary boards.  
The FRC used the Higgs Review and its proposed code changes as the basis for a light-
touch, ‘fatal flaws only’ consultation. The response was rather stronger than it expected.55 
The Association of British Insurers, a mainstream investor voice, saw a ‘potential danger to 
the unitary board’ if the code had a ‘formal requirement’ that non-executive directors meet 
periodically without the executives or the chairman present (April 2003).56 In a literal sense, 
this is arguing against a case Higgs did not make. Higgs did not require such a move in what 
is a voluntary code; the text of his draft was that of recommendation: ‘should meet regularly 
as a group without the executives present and at least once a year without the chairman 
present’,57 where ‘should’ also sits underneath the code’s ‘comply-or-explain’ principle.  
The Confederation of British Industry, representing the interests of large corporations, 
used more forceful language to make a similar point. It expressed ‘deep reservations’ about 
provisions that ‘concern or affect the chairman’, whose role is ‘pivotal in the UK’s tried and 
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tested unitary board system’. The choice of ‘pivotal’ here echoes with irony Higgs’s own 
language,58 seeking to reverse its inferred intent. The CBI’s next sentence elaborates this 
concern relating it to separate meetings of non-executives, suggesting the provision ‘could be 
misunderstood and could lead to a two-tier board in practice’ (16 April 2003). The use of 
‘could be misunderstood’ is an example of language aimed at repairing unintended damage in 
drafting to maintain the core values of the code. The word might also be seen as a diplomatic 
way of disrupting a feared change in direction. As in the ABI submission, the value in a 
unitary board does not receive, or seem to require, explanation or articulation; neither does 
the ‘danger’ or ‘risk’ in a two-tier board. 
 Sentiment on this point was even stronger among company chairmen. For example, Sir 
Brian Moffat, chairman of the steelmaker Corus, wrote (20 March 2003) in his capacity as 
senior independent director of the banking group HSBC not to the FRC, but to its perceived 
political master: Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Patricia Hewitt. He began by 
stating discomfort about writing separately from the rest of the board, lest it be viewed 
‘undermining the unitary board principle or the Chairman’s position’. Such was the ‘strength 
of feeling and support in the Board’ that he needed to add his voice to that of the HSBC 
chairman, Sir John Bond, who also wrote to Hewitt on this point (17 March 2003), and later 
to the FRC (11 April 2003). Moffat wrote under Corus letterhead, making a symbolic claim 
of legitimacy in his identity as a company chairman, as well. 
Board design in the post-financial crisis debate 
The issue of overall board structure came up again in the debate leading up to the 2010 
code. In the initial consultation in early 2009, with its open invitation to raise matters of 
interest, several mainstream investors and companies alike chose to emphasise the need for a 
unitary board.  
 
We consider that the unitary board model still represents the most 
appropriate way forward in the UK context. We also fully support the 
continued separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive, and an 
appropriately balanced board (ABI, May 2009, p. 2). 
In assessing the merits of these various proposals we have been mindful of 
the need to … [p]reserve unitary board structures, with both executive and 
non-executive directors contributing effectively to the operation of the 
board (CBI, May 2009, p. 2).  
Sentiments like these might have appeared to be boilerplate, language dusted off and 
reused from a previous consultation paper and not of import, except that the issue was still 
alive among other actors in the field. Some of them were fringe actors, but others, like the 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, were closer to the centre. A professional 
body with longstanding engagement in corporate governance and many of its accountant-
members working in corporations, the ACCA would not normally be seen as peripheral to the 
field, but its first submission stated: 
 
As a first step, the FRC should consider the implications of introducing as 
an option a two-tier board structure and should consider the changes to the 
Code that would need to be articulated (ACCA, May 2009, p. 3). 
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Its argument was that the financial crisis demonstrated that current arrangements had 
failed. It laid the blame on the failure of non-executive directors to control managers, and on 
the custodians of the code for permitting an ‘untimely’ (p. 2) relaxation in 2008 of the 
constraints on board chairmen and audit committee membership. Boards needed greater 
independence, not less: 
  
To draw attention to the failure of independent directors is not to say that 
less reliance should be placed upon them in the future. But consideration 
needs to be given to addressing the causes of their ineffectiveness. 
While two-tier board structures have not always been notably successful, 
they can contribute to ensuring that the supervisory board directs and 
oversees, while the management board manages. In practice, much depends 
on the composition and powers of the two boards in a two-tier structure 
(ACCA, May 2009, p. 2). 
The early mention in (albeit limited) support for two-tier boards through the debate 
signals that the idea has legitimacy among at least some actors in the field, even though it 
remains a largely alien concept.  
Contributors on the other side, however, affirm the counter-argument but leave it largely 
unarticulated. The CBI, for example, states that its members, ‘including investor members, 
strongly uphold the UK’s unitary board system’; it later states: ‘there is also a need to avoid 
proposals that tend towards two tier boards’ (CBI, October 2009). Use of the passive voice 
here sweeps away any actor, as if the reader – that is, the authors of the code – needed no 
explanation. The argument was suppressed because its logic was taken for granted.59 
Discussion 
The issue of board design is emblematic of the purpose of the board. This study shows 
how the contestation of logics was not so much resolved over time but instead suspended. It 
demonstrates how participation seems to develop its own logic, embracing a wide range of 
opinions without entirely settling the disputes. 
Logics in use 
Throughout these consultations, actors sought to win their arguments and appeals to these 
logics, which had been legitimated to a greater or lesser extent in other organisational fields. 
Even when they made assertions, rather than arguments, the voices in the debate spoke as 
though their logics-in-use were understood and taken for granted, as institutional theory 
suggests. Moreover, some actors attempted to import competing logics from Europe or the 
US to the UK. That the arguments these logics entail often remained suppressed suggests that 
other actors already accept, at one level or another, the legitimacy of these solutions.  
For example, in 1992 Charkham (CAD-01073) called for ‘real accountability’ without 
definition, inviting Cadbury to discover his own meaning, translating from practices 
elsewhere whether that was hierarchical to shareholders, mutual among directors in the 
boardroom or both. In 2003, the language used by company chairman in urging changes in 
the text invited the FRC to interpret their calls either as signs of their stewardship and a logic 
grounded in the corporation, or as a signal of the legitimacy of shareholder value 
maximisation based on markets. In 2009-10, the ACCA’s call for German-style boards with 
worker co-determination rests explicitly on a logic embracing shareholder value 
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maximisation. But it imports with it an implicit and unstated acceptance of the legitimacy of 
co-determination and with it a logic based on the value of a wider community. That the latter 
is unstated leaves other actors in the field free to translate the call to suit their understanding 
and see in it heightened monitoring and control.  
Over the course of the three periods, many of those supporting unitary boards came from 
the core actors occupying the central ground in the field. Companies and their collective 
associations (in particular the CBI) made strongly worded statements but rarely reasoned 
arguments. Their incumbent position in the centre of the field did not need a defence; rather, 
the code – a voluntary, not statutory institution – required their assent. Theirs was an 
assertion that current arrangements were not just appropriate, but superior to the alien 
concepts of European, German or indeed American practice.  
Mainstream institutional investors and their associations (most prominently the ABI) 
supported this view; many such actors were themselves listed companies and sat on both 
sides of corporate-investor divide. The advantages of incumbent institutional arrangements 
were taken for granted, so much so they scarcely needed argumentation. Investors in general 
did not make their cases on the basis of what agency theory would lead us to think was their 
interest, that is, to enhance the monitoring and control function through board structure. Their 
logic might reasonably arise from the institutional order of markets, with its focus on the 
transaction, shareholder primacy and narrow self-interest. The listed insurance companies 
that manage equity investments might reasonably be assumed to have faced contesting, even 
contradictory logics. What we see, however, is something rather different: the absence of 
conflict on this point, even when the investors were not listed companies or the individuals 
responding were not in positions to represent the corporate rather than functional (fund 
management) imperatives. Theirs was in the main a hybrid logic, claiming shareholder 
primacy but accepting the risk of managerialism in that non-executive directors might be 
captured by the executives for the sake of strong performance through collegiality and the 
‘service’ function of directors.  
The advisers, and especially the accountancy firms, echoed the sentiments of 
corporations and investors on this point, though not universally and not with the degree of 
assumption that the incumbent position needed no defence. But the profession was 
undergoing its own institutional change during this time, as reflected in public discourse,60 
involving a contest between professional and commercial logics61 and perhaps making these 
actors more sensitive to corporate interests and values. 
Those supporting two-tier boards and therefore institutional change came, with important 
exceptions, from more peripheral positions in the field. Their arguments draw upon a 
language of high performance, secure investments and long-term orientation, characteristics 
of German corporate performance. Their texts, mainly tacitly though from the most 
peripheral actors explicitly, invoke employee rights, stakeholder theory and the associated 
curbs on behaviour seen as rapacious Anglo-American capitalism. These are sentiments 
associated more with the collectivism, with its ideas of shared commitment. That these 
associations are not always explicit in many of the texts does not mean they are not there. 
They featured prominently in the discourse in news media at the time.62 
Those actors straddling the debate were an eclectic bunch, in part peripheral, in part more 
central to the field. Some suggested novel approaches (e.g. the Liberal Democrats in 1992); 
others endorsed experimentation (Arthur Andersen in 1992 and, it seems, Sir Adrian Cadbury 
himself). They were the institutional entrepreneurs,63 agitating for change of less specific 
character to address evident failings in current institutional arrangements. Their arguments 
embody assumptions or show the willingness to cross boundaries.  
How this debate was resolved has had a variety of effects for the relationship between the 
corporation and investors and on the relationships across the field, in shaping a language of 
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corporate governance that gains acceptance and builds a community. But at the same time, set 
against the changing context, the debate raises questions about the code’s affirmation a set of 
mainstream actors increasingly less central to the investment field.  
These expressions of ambiguity and the suppression of arguments, assumed and taken for 
granted, suggest that actors have and want room to interpret the logic as they see fit and blend 
it with others as circumstances require.64 These half-told arguments, with their scope for 
reinterpretation by other actors, create room for accommodation with other contestation, a 
way to set conflict to the side for the sake of agreement, in the knowledge, first, that the code 
will be revisited before too long, and second, that if corporations do not comply they will still 
have the option to explain.  
Relationships and power 
The detail of the debate analysed above shows that through this period, actors in the 
centre of the field – the traditional UK corporations and mainstream UK investors – lost more 
arguments than they won on measures that might introduce a two-tier board through the back 
door, and lost in 2003 some they had arguments they had won in 1992. But they demanded 
and retained affirmation of the value of a unitary board. Indeed, the change in tone in 2010 
reinforced the ethos of a unitary board even as it left in place the structures weighing against 
it.  
Peripheral actors seeking institutional change won the substance of theirs, if not in the 
form they might have liked. Those urging experimentation in board design lost in 1992 and 
2003 but won in 2010, assuming companies embraced the spirit rather than the letter of the 
code that Nordberg and McNulty document.65 They won concessions in the code, through 
measures to increase board independence that mimicked the two-tier board and therefore 
created the check the Cadbury Code sought on the ‘unfettered power’ of executives in 
corporate decision-making. That they won them perversely concentrated power in the centre 
of the field, in the hands of mainstream institutional investors while limiting the outcomes of 
employee empowerment and stakeholder rights they had sought. But by having the debate, 
the process created an avenue for continued dialogue. 
That the debate has not concluded points to research opportunities tracking whether 
power consolidates in the centre of embraces more of the elements that the more peripheral 
actors wanted to see. In particular, the calls for experimentation in board design that Sir 
Adrian Cadbury acknowledged may be worth monitoring, in view of the failure of the 
mainstream solutions tried so far to prevent catastrophic corporate failures.  
Acceptance of legitimacy of disparate voices 
The debate, and the process that leads to continuing dialogue, gave legitimacy to a wide 
variety of actors and interests other than those in the centre of the field and with the cosy 
relationships of old in the City. It also provided a language in which the debate could be 
framed. One consequence was, therefore, the creation of a community of corporate 
governance made up of individuals who participated in the debate, even at several steps 
removed, and learned its language.  
Here further research might explore the sociology of the field. Some of the actors whose 
voices we have heard are now departed – individuals who have died or organisations which 
have been acquired of themselves collapsed. But the continuation of the debate has brought 
others of similar character into the conversation. Is the sense of a community a strong one 
that gives a trajectory to the debate? Or are the interests of actors so strong that the institution 
of the code will grow rigid and impervious to change?  
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Fit with the changing context 
Indeed, the voices heard in the debates in 1991-92, 2003 and 2009-10 were remarkably 
similar and in some cases identical voices. Missing from the later debates were the new actors 
on the scene, notably the sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds and the large mainstream 
institutional investors from the United States and other countries, which now collectively 
hold the majority of UK shares. Their influence on corporate decision-making is 
considerable, as shareholder activism has gained force from the affirmation of the special 
position of institutional investors as guardians of the corporate governance in Cadbury and 
since. The financial crisis gave new impetus to shareholder activism in many countries,66 
which may have the consequence of focusing attention of corporate executives on 
shareholder interest to the exclusion of the wider range of actors that the debate over board 
design gave voice.  
Respondents to the Cadbury Committee and again in 2003 included representatives of 
many of the largest corporations. By 2010, however, the make-up of the London Stock 
Exchange listing included many foreign corporations, which sought its liquidity and the 
legitimacy association with UK corporate governance. Yet these voices played little role in 
the 2010 debate. 
Moreover, formal institutional development in law and regulation may diminish the hold 
of a voluntary code of conduct like the UK Corporate Governance Code, in particular over 
the minds of the more peripheral actors. The absence of those voices – of those on the 
periphery and those in the new gravitational centre of the field – from future debates would 
throw the legitimacy of the code, its prescriptions and its flexibility, into doubt.  
Conclusions 
This study has examined how the UK code of corporate governance was created and how 
it developed over time. Its development has not only influenced the practice of corporations 
and investors, it has informed institution-building in countries well beyond the UK. By 
looking in detail at one issue, the design of the board, it gives insights about how codes of 
conduct emerge and institutionalise without stamping out alternative understandings that 
might hold value in other ways and perhaps at another time.  
It suggests that by engaging in the process of code-writing, actors may be creating a new 
logic, arising more from a collective stance rather than the narrower interests and a new 
community. It thus affirms the view in Puxty et al.67 that the changes in structure of social 
relations happen at the interaction of domains, where new principles and logics develop. It 
also suggests that those principles and logics can gain legitimacy without full acceptance if 
the values they embody include openness and thoughtfulness. 
But the study also raises questions about whether such processes of semi-formal 
institutions like the UK code can keep pace with a rapidly changing market context and the 
attempts by authorities to adapt formal institutions in response. Even when the processes are 
open and their outcomes flexible, they remain institutionalised. Apart from the three 
responses to crises examined in this study, revision to the UK code has become a ritualised 
affair, with layers of new principles and guidelines added to those already in place. This is a 
field in much flux and one that needs continuing attention from scholars, practitioners and 
policy-makers alike.  
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Appendix 1 – Consultation processes, 1992, 2003, 2009-10 
After wide-ranging interviews and exchanges of letters, Sir Adrian Cadbury and his 
committee wrote a draft code mid-1992 and invited formal responses to it. The archive 
records several hundred communications before and then again after the May 1992 draft 
code. Following the Higgs Review in January 2003, the FRC held a ‘fatal flaws only’ review 
of the draft code that Higgs had proposed. The result was a torrent of protest that the FRC 
chairman Sir Bryan Nicholson68 later recalled as ‘media noise level and the hostility … by 
company Chairmen’. In this consultation, the FRC heard from about 180 organisations and 
individuals, mainly on the corporate side, though mainstream investors and their associations 
responded as well. In 2009-10 came a three-stage consultation, which sought views on the 
code itself and also on whether the lessons learned from a separate study of governance in the 
financial services sector might have broader application in industry. The FRC received more 
than a hundred responses in each phase, with new voices appeared in the latter two stages. 
The FRC chairman, Sir Christopher Hogg, a veteran company executive and chairman who 
had served as adviser to Cadbury in 1992, then took all the contributions and with the help of 
FRC staff fashioned a new code with a new tone.69  
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Table 1 - Responses of investors to Cadbury draft on board design 
Source Comment 
Postel Investment 
Management70 
(CAD-02195) 
… the report in one or two places comes dangerously close to 
undermining the concept of the unitary board.  
Institutional Fund 
Managers 
Association (CAD-
02397) 
The Report draws too great a distinction between the responsibilities 
of executive and non-executive directors and could be taken to imply 
that their interests are somehow opposed. We believe that the Code 
should place greater emphasis on the need for each director to 
recognise his responsibility for corporate governance, however the 
Board is constituted, and for the Board as a whole to recognise its 
responsibility and that of each of its members. 
Legal & General 
(CAD-02353) 
We are however concerned that Board balance between executive 
and non executive should not be translated into a separation into 
supervisory and non supervisory functions with the two-tier 
implication that that would suggest. We see the directors as having 
different roles but equal responsibilities, with all of them ultimately 
being responsible to those who elect them – the shareholders. 
British Rail Pension 
Fund (CAD-02453) 
The additional duties proposed for non-executive directors (together 
with the previously mentioned head of non-executives) may bring a 
division into the board if non-executives are to take on a more 
supervisory role. It is probably more important for companies to 
describe their internal monitoring procedures and formally report on 
their operation in the annual report than for a general duty to monitor 
being ascribed to particular members of a unitary board.  
National Association 
of Pension Funds 
(CAD-02449) 
So far as reporting to shareholders is concerned, your suggestion that 
the chairman of the remuneration committee be responsible for 
answering questions at the Annual General Meeting may well 
undermine, to some extent, the concept of the unitary board.  
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Table 2 - Accountants’ responses to Cadbury draft on board design 
Source Comment 
Coopers & 
Lybrand 
(CAD-
02363) 
… the language of the draft report as it stands tends to imply a sharper 
division between the roles of non-executives and executives than the 
Committee probably intends. We do not believe there is a satisfactory half 
way house between the two tier board and the collegiate board. 
Pannell Kerr 
Forster 
(CAD-
02373) 
We understand and accept that there is a need for a division of 
responsibilities within a board and that no large listed company should be 
capable of being dominated by one individual but we are concerned about the 
apparent belief that within a board there should be two leaders. We feel very 
strongly that the duty of the Board (within the constraints of the law) as a 
whole is to create wealth for the investors. The Board has, therefore, to work 
as a team, and not to be put in a position where half the Board’s main 
purpose appears to be to police the activities of the other half. We are 
concerned that whilst the report makes this point … the overall impression of 
the report, because it deals with controls is one where the vision of the non-
executive is that he is there to dismiss the chief executive should this prove 
necessary rather than provide positive input to the future direction and 
success of the company. We believe non executive directors have an 
important role to play in bringing their broader experience to bear on the 
board’s discussions. 
Ernst & 
Young 
(CAD-
02447) 
We acknowledge the important contribution which non-executive directors 
can and should make in this direction but believe that the Committee’s 
expectations of non-executive directors are unrealistic. We also believe that 
certain aspects of the role which the Committee proposes for non-executive 
directors are inimical to the concept of the unitary board…. The Committee’s 
proposals would create a two-tier board within the legal structure of a unitary 
board. We do not regard this as tenable.  
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Table 3 - Corporate reaction to Cadbury draft on board design 
Source Comment 
Lord Tombs, chairman, 
Rolls-Royce plc (CAD-
02377). 
In our view distinctions between the responsibilities of 
executive and non-executive directors, save in relation to 
remuneration, are both divisive and, for example, in the 
case of decision making through a two tier board, a sham. 
Confederation of 
British Industry (CAD-
02349). 
In that setting it is for the board to distribute functions to 
its members; attempts to reserve tasks as a rule to one 
class of directors will create the danger of opening the 
way to a two-tier system…. We oppose the words 
‘monitor the executive management’ as imparting a 
supervisory role inappropriate to a unitary board. 
Institute of Directors 
(CAD-02423) 
Whilst the presence of such a system of checks and 
balances is an integral element of effective corporate 
governance, it should not way be allowed to erode the 
principle of a unitary board. 
J.F. Mahony, Group 
Finance Director and 
Vice-Chairman, 
Ladbroke Group 
(CAD-02441) 
I would resist any movement towards a two-tier system. I 
believe that paragraph 4.3 is unhelpful as the role of the 
non-executive directors outlined in it appears to conflict 
with the principle of a unitary board in so far as it implies 
that the purpose of the non-executive directors is to 
monitor the performance of the board. In this context, the 
non-executive directors must be monitoring the 
performance of the executive members of the board, not 
the board as a whole. The draft report should be amended 
to make it clear that the principle of a unitary board is 
upheld in all respects. 
Alick Rankin, 
Chairman, Scottish & 
Newcastle (CAD-
02455) 
The code, as proposed, appears to identify non-executive 
directors as ‘the gamekeepers’ and executives as ‘the 
poachers’. Clearly, this must be quite wrong. It is both 
divisive and intrusive and damaging to the positive 
partnership spirit essential in a unitary board. Non-
executives have a strong requirement to encourage, to 
support and to enthuse – this concept is lacking and 
severely threatened by the proposals.  
Peter Jinks, Company 
Secretary, Cadbury-
Schweppes (CAD-
02385) 
The emphasis on more involvement and accountability of 
Non-Executive Directors emerging from Corporate 
Governance must not result in or encourage two tier 
Boards, which would be of considerable commercial 
disadvantage to the company and its investors. 
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22
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23
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24
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31
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43
 Arthur Andersen was at the time a highly respected voice in the accountancy profession. Its 
disintegration a decade later after the collapse of clients Enron, WorldCom and others may be 
traced in part to what we might term governance ‘experimentation’, but not perhaps 
experiments in enhanced supervision.  
44
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45
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